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ABSTRACT
Unambiguous state discrimination (USD) is one of the major obstacles for practical quantum key distribution (QKD). Often
overlooked, it allows efficient eavesdropping in majority of practical systems, provided the overall channel loss is above a certain
threshold. Thus, to remain secure all such systems must not only monitor the actual loss, but also possess a comprehensive
information on the safe ’loss vs. BER’ levels, which is often well beyond currently known security analyses. The more advanced
the protocol the tougher it becomes to find and prove corresponding bounds. To get out of this vicious circle and solve the
problem outright, we demonstrate a so called relativistic QKD system, which uses causality to become inherently immune to
USD-based attacks. The system proves to be practical in metropolitan line-of-sight arrangements. At the same time it has a
very basic structure that allows for a straightforward and comprehensive security analysis.
Introduction
The workhorse of quantum cryptography has always been the
BB841 protocol, whose elegance mainly comes from the use
of true single photons. It also enables quite unique and com-
prehensive security proof2–4. At the same time, no practical
QKD protocol can use the same information carriers: they
have to rely upon weak coherent pulses (WCPs) instead. As
WCPs are formally infinite-dimensional quantum systems,
there is always a non-zero probability of unambiguous dis-
crimination of the transmitted states in the channel5–7. Thus,
starting from some level of loss, conventional WCP-based
QKD systems inevitably lose their guaranteed security. Corre-
sponding thresholds are well-known for simple protocols as
B928 and WCP-based BB847, but, to the best of our knowl-
edge, still far from being found for popular WCP-based COW9
and DPS10 protocols, whose security proofs, thus, may be con-
sidered incomplete. To avoid this potential security breach at
high channel loss we argue that additional measures have to
be taken in the protocol design to completely disallow mask-
ing unsuccessful unambiguous state discrimination (USD) in
losses.
Earlier, many efforts were directed towards developing pro-
tection against a much more narrow than USD type of attack,
the photon number splitting (PNS). They resulted in vari-
ous decoy state strategies11, 12, which seem to help providing
protection against PNS by the cost of monitoring multiple
additional channel statistics besides the simple loss. To the
best of our understanding, these strategies lack simple security
grounds and fail to show clear and universal security proof.
In general, this approach just admits the faulty use of WCPs
in BB84-like protocols and tries to make up additional mea-
sures to save these (impractical) protocols, instead of finding
a universal solution.
A better idea is to design new protocols, where WCP na-
ture of information carriers is already accounted for. A valid
approach known from the early days is the B92 with a strong
phase reference13, where the presence of the strong reference
pulse makes it impossible for Eve to send vacuum states if
the USD fails to get a conclusive result. Another alternative
first coined in14 with single photons and later re-invented in
a practical form in15 is to use relativistic limitations. They
allow to force Eve make decisions about her actions before
she can actually measure the state in the line, thus break-
ing her only winning strategy due to causality. In this paper
we demonstrate an improved experimental realization of this
protocol, where we implemented an efficient one-way configu-
ration with an active single-mode free-space channel tracking
system, demonstrating stable operation over 180 m.
Results
The relativistic protocol is schematically shown in Fig. 1 as a
space-time diagram. Its key component is the quantum trans-
mission with the speed of light in two time windows separated
by a measurable time interval ∆T . The key generation proce-
dure looks very much like B92 protocol13. To establish one
bit of the raw key Alice and Bob randomly choose one bit of
information each: bA and bB respectively, where b ∈ {0,1}.
Alice transmits two pulses: a reference WCP |α〉 in the first
time window and a signal |eibAϕα〉 in the second. Bob applies
a phase shift of bBϕ to the first time window and measures the
result of interference between the two. He can only detect a
photon if bA 6= bB, otherwise there is a destructive interference
between the two pulses and, therefore, the vacuum state in
the detector. So any time Bob’s detector clicks, he tells this to
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Figure 1. Space-time diagram of the relativistic protocol.
The two pulses travel with the speed of light, thus, forbidding
Eve’s actions on the first pulse dependent on her
measurement of the second, modulated one. PHM – phase
modulator, BS – symmetric beamsplitter, SPD –
single-photon detector.
Alice and they end up with one more bit of the raw key.
In the conventional B92, eavesdropping strategy is straight-
forward. There is a certain probability of USD between |α〉
and |eiϕα〉, so whenever Eve succeeds in her measurement
she retransmits the correct state. If the USD fails Eve blocks
both pulses, so the overall effect is indistinguishable from the
genuine lossy channel.
The relativistic protocol ensures that at any moment the
first pulse lies outside the light cone generated by the second
one, so there cannot be any causal connection from the second
to the first one. Therefore, any Eve’s measurements of the data
pulse cannot affect her actions on the reference. To ensure the
proper space-time relation between the pulses, the distance
L between Alice and Bob should be known a-priori as it is a
critical security parameter of the protocol. All signals delayed
in the channel by more than L/c, where c is the speed of light,
are ignored. In this modified framework Eve has no ability
to block the reference pulse depending on her measurement
result, as it would contradict the causality principles. However,
if any one of the two pulses in the channel is missing, Bob sees
the results uncorrelated with the states Alice sent, producing
errors in the raw key. So whenever Eve lets the reference
through, but then fails to measure the data pulse, she causes
errors in the raw key. On the contrary, if she blocks the
reference, but retransmits even the correct data pulse, she
causes errors too. This picture has much in common with the
strong phase reverence version of B92. The strong classical
reference cannot be removed from the channel because this
is directly detectable. If, on the contrary, it is present without
the correct WCP companion, it inevitably produces errors.
While both approaches offer ultimate protection against USD,
we believe that our relativistic protocol is less technology
demanding and can be more practical.
Each detector click gives Bob one bit of information, as he
effectively performs post selection, i.e. chooses only those
pulses for which his measurement succeeds. On the contrary,
Eve’s actions cannot depend on her measurement results, oth-
erwise Bob would see uncorrelated with Alice bits. When
Eve gets a measurement result, i.e. not earlier than the second
time window, it is already too late to reach the first window,
located beyond the light cone16. Therefore, her information
per any channel use is fundamentally limited by the capacity
of such binary quantum channel, i.e. by the Holevo quantity17.
The difference between Bob’s information and the fundamen-
tally limited information of Eve gives the room for secret key
generation. That is, transmission with the speed of light over
the known distance, together with precise synchronization and
timing, gives a new security component to QKD that offers
assured protection against USD-based and any intercept and
resend attacks.
An efficient experimental realization is another question
addressed in this work. Transitioning to a one-way quantum
channel configuration makes the system more protected from
Eve’s actions, compared to the double-pass one15, where Eve
could manipulate classical pulses traveling from Bob to Alice.
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It also greatly improved the operation rate of the system, as
there is no need to wait the round-trip time to send more data
into the channel.
As the security of such causality-based relativistic protocol
relies on precise timing, synchronization plays a critical role
in the protocol. Malicious altering of the synchronization
process may easily break the foundations of the protocol se-
curity, opening a backdoor for eavesdropping. Therefore a
special secure procedure was developed to guarantee proper
synchronization during the protocol operation. It requires a
backward classical channel where information travels with
the speed of light.
To initiate quantum transmission Bob generates a random
bit sequence and sends it to Alice using the classical channel
with the same rate that Alice uses for QKD. At each received
bit Alice stores it in her local memory and transmits one WCP
into the quantum channel. After the whole packet is transmit-
ted, Bob and Alice compare their synchronization sequences.
If the sequences are the same, Alice can guarantee that she
received each bit not earlier than Bob expects her to get it.
Otherwise, it would be a superluminal information transfer
between Bob and Alice, which contradicts the relativity the-
ory. That directly means that Alice never sent any quantum
state into the channel earlier than Bob thinks she did. At the
same time, this is the only case when Eve would have an extra
time to act after her measurement without causing errors: if
she could force Alice to transmit earlier than Bob thinks, the
protocol would be broken. If, on the contrary, Alice sends her
pulses later, Bob just will not receive any correlated with Alice
raw key, so the packet will be discarded as not containing any
secret information. If after comparison the synchronization
sequence received by Alice appears to differ from that of Bob,
it is a potential sign of an ongoing synchronization attack and
the whole packet must be discarded as unreliable.
The backward communication channel required for syn-
chronization is realized via the tracking system, which also
serves for transmission of service data and control messages
in both directions between the parties. Besides data commu-
nication, the tracking system is needed to keep the quantum
channel up, as, in the contrast to conventional free-space QKD
systems, the present one needs a single mode receiver, which
is compatible with a fiber-based delay interferometer. With-
out active tracking, the system was extremely unstable when
mounted on standard theodolite tripods and would not operate
reliably even for a few minutes. With the tracking system
implemented it showed good performance at least for hours,
although we did not check the stability for a longer time.
More detailed information about the single mode channel and
the tracking system can be found in Supplementary. There
is also a discussion about the difference between the group
velocity of pulses in the air and the speed of light, which is
insignificant for the implemented parameters of the protocol.
Another experimental challenge addressed in our one-way
design is the proper alignment of the receiving side interfer-
ometer. To simplify the setup we eliminated the transmission
side delay interferometer altogether and used a CW laser in-
stead. Thus, Alice’s side contains only a narrow linewidth
CW laser (external cavity diode laser), a phase modulator
and an attenuator, as shown in Fig. 2. The receiving side has
a polarization maintaining fiber based delay interferometer
with a phase modulator in one of the arms, which serves for
both interferometer alignment (with a quasi-DC bias) and data
modulation during the QKD stage. The bias is constantly
adjusted according to the number of single photon detector
clicks when biased at pi/2 below and above the normal level
that corresponds to the dark interferometer output. A whole
cycle of the modulator work is shown in Fig. 3. More details
on interferometer alignment are found in Supplementary.
The main operation parameters are as follows. Each trans-
mitted quantum symbol is a 10 ns long piece of the CW laser
signal at λ = 780 nm with the output intensity of -92.9 . . . -
78.9 dBm, which corresponds to 0.02 . . . 0.5 photons per pulse.
The delay ∆T in the receiving interferometer is 20 ns, so each
symbol interferes with the corresponding chunk of the CW
signal going ∆T ahead (the phase reference window). The
depth of phase modulation equals 0.8pi . Phase modulated
symbols come in packets of 65536 bits each with the average
rate of 25 MHz. A packet can be sent in any phase modulator
cycle, which is 16 ms long (see Fig 3). However, the actual
packet rate was limited by the time needed to exchange the
random data buffers and measurement results with a PC via a
USB interface, so the actual rate was about 2 packets/sec.
The whole system consists of two similar stations, each
containing a box with electronics and fiber-based elements,
and a free-space channel tracking platform placed on a tripod
as shown in Fig. 4. The quantum single-mode free-space
channel uses diffraction-limited 1” diameter aspheric lenses
to collimate radiation to/from single-mode polarization main-
taining fibers. Quantum signals are spatially mixed with the
850 nm beacon radiation used by the tracking system. Beacon
light is detected by a quadrant photodiode to provide feed-
back to the piezo driven steering mirror. It also delivers a
25 Mbit/s Manchester encoded classical signal used for secure
synchronization and transfer of auxiliary information between
stations. The tested channel length of 180 m was actually
limited by the length of the building, while the system itself
was designed to operate over as far as 400 m.
The system operates in two modes: with pseudo-random
bit sequences (PRBS) and with real random data. The first
one is used for testing purposes as it provides an easy way to
calculate quantum bit error ratio (QBER) without utilization
of the classical channel (stations know the pseudo-random
sequences used at the other end of the line). The second
mode works with real random data from a quantum random
number generator (QRNG)18 stored at laptops. Figure 5 shows
system efficiency and QBER for the PRBS operation mode at
different photon levels.
To estimate the asymptotic secret key rate we use the in-
formation based approach. The raw information obtained by
Bob must be reduced to eliminate the Eve’s information, or
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Figure 2. Experimental setup schematic. LT – laptop-based user station; DG – diffraction grating in Littrow configuration;
L – lens; M – mirror; PHM – 150 MHz lithium niobate fiber-coupled phase modulator; ATT – variable optical attenuator;
CTRL – control electronics; EA – electronic error amplifier in the tracking feedback loop; DM – dichroic mirror; TM – piezo
tip-tilt mirror; QD – quadrant photodetector; DF – ground glass-based diffuser; BS – symmetric beamsplitter; IRS – 25 mm iris
diaphragm; BPF – band-pass filter; CAM – coarse pointing camera; MON – user monitor for the camera; SPD – silicon
avalanche photodiode-based single-photon detector.
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Figure 3. Operation of the receiving interferometer phase
modulator. In each 16 ms cycle first it measures count
frequencies in two quadrature points to adjust the bias, and
then proceeds to the QKD sequence.
Figure 4. Station Alice: a tripod with a free-space channel
tracking platform and a box with fiber optic components and
all electronics.
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Figure 5. System efficiency and QBER measured in PRBS
operation mode vs. the average photon number. The figure
also shows the calculated number of asymptotic secret bits
per packet as well as the critical QBER, above which no
secret bits can be extracted. Error bars on the QBER plot are
purely statistical ones corresponding to the uncertainty of
QBER estimation based on the finite number of obtained bits.
More precisely, they depict a 95% binomial proportion
confidence interval for all raw bits accumulated in a
particular setting.
more accurately, the information that could potentially leak to
Eve. As the raw key always contains some errors, a portion
of the raw key is also used for error correction. As discussed
earlier, the implemented relativistic scheme disallow Eve’s
influence on the received quanta in the way that her actions
depend on results of her measurements. Without this ability
to post-select, Eve cannot decide which pulses will travel to
Bob and produce detector clicks and which she will block
contributing to the channel loss. At most she can obtain the
average information per pulse. Effectively, Eve’s information
is bounded by the Holevo quantity17:
χ(µ,ϕ) = h
(
1− exp(−2µ sin2(ϕ/2)
2
)
,
where h(p) =−p log(p)−(1− p) log(1− p); ϕ = 0.8pi is the
modulation depth, and µ is the average number of photons per
pulse. Ideal asymptotic error correction requires h(QBER)
bits, so the overall asymptotic secret key rate equals R =
1− χ(µ,ϕ)−h(QBER). It should be noted that here we do
not take into account any finite-size effects, as they do not
qualitatively change the results. Some elaboration for finite-
sized sequences is published elsewhere16.
At small µ Eve’s information is small, but the estimated se-
cret key length is severely limited by the high QBER. At large
µ QBER decreases, however, the Eve’s information becomes
the limiting factor. The maximum efficiency is observed at
around µ = 0.1 as follows from Fig. 5.
Operation with real data from QRNG was performed to
distribute actual raw keys. Privacy amplification and error
correction was not implemented in the experiment, as it is
relatively straightforward, but too time consuming for this
proof of principle demonstration. Therefore, all estimations
are made using the asymptotic relation found above and the
obtained raw keys. Figure 6 shows experimentally measured
data — raw key length and QBER — as well as asymptotically
estimated number of secret bits. Each data point shows the
result of a particular exchange of 1.68×107 WCPs between
Alice and Bob. For some photon numbers per pulse we made
a few measurements to ensure the repeatability of the results,
for other just a single key exchange was performed. The
most efficient secret key generation was observed at µ =
0.116, where the raw key generation rate (inside a packet)
equals 2170 bits/sec and the asymptotic secret key rate is
estimated as 660 bits/sec. As mentioned earlier, average rates
are substantially smaller due to the slow data exchange with
laptops: 20 and 6.2 bits/sec respectively.
The performance of the single-mode free-space channel is
another thing to mention. Although it was inside a building,
heating and ventilation caused a significant mode distortion.
Typical wandering frequency is measured to be below 10 Hz,
so the tracking system with the bandwidth of 10’s of Hz
substantially helped in reducing the loss. Nevertheless, active
tracking could only compensate for the beam shift as a whole,
but not the mode distortion. The measured free-space quantum
channel loss (the ratio between the transmitted power and the
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Figure 6. Key lengths and QBERs vs. the average photon
number for QKD with random data from the QRNG. Each
point is a result of QKD with 16 Mbit input buffers, i.e. 256
packets transmitted. Error bars on the QBER plot show the
95% binomial proportion confidence interval for the
particular raw key obtained in the corresponding data point.
Rx fiber-coupled power) is around 13 dB. At the same time
the overall system efficiency, i.e. the ratio of detected photons
to the transmitted ones, was 1.5×10−3.
Discussion
The presented concept of the relativistic or causality-based
QKD provides a new dimension to conventional quantum
cryptography. Its main advantage is in complete decoupling
between the channel loss and the security level. No additional
tests are required (at least in theory), besides the standard
privacy amplification and error correction, to guarantee infor-
mation theoretic key security. In this sense it has much in
common with the original B92 protocol with strong reference
pulses. At the same time, the presented protocol seems to be
less technology demanding, as, to the best of our knowledge,
there is no experimental demonstration of the original B92
yet. This comes in exchange for the additional assumptions
that we need from the channel, namely, the knowledge of the
channel length.
The channel length or, more precisely, distance between
Alice and Bob plays a critical security role in the relativistic
protocol. It is an important security parameter, which should
be known a-priori to guarantee the protocol security. Formally,
one cannot be more confident in the security of the generated
keys, than he is confident in the distance between the parties.
However, this can be eased by placing a restriction only on
the lower bound of the channel length.
In fact, increasing the delay ∆T between two pulses one
can tolerate more deviation between the actual time of flight
and L/c. There is a more detailed discussion on that subject
in Supplementary, but in general one has to make sure that the
second pulse cannot overtake the first one even if the second
one travels along the straight line between Alice and Bob with
the speed of light. Thus, the minimal required delay between
the pulses equals ∆Tmin = 2(To− Lmin/c), where To is the
observed time of flight, Lmin is the lower confidence bound
for the value of L, and the factor of 2 is included because
in this particular implementation the synchronization process
relies upon the same channel and therefore can be offset by the
same amount. It could be, however, cut in half if an external
trusted synchronization scheme is used.
As L is always positive, ∆T > 2To is a safe, but often
impractical choice. To remain practical, one would want
∆T  To. This is feasible for a large-distance free space com-
munication with a moving target confined in some relatively
small area, e.g. inside a town. Another possible strategy is
using hollow core photonic crystal fibers (PCFs), where the ef-
fective refraction index is demonstrated to be as low as 1.003
and the optical loss is expected to beat that of conventional
silica fibers19. Future hollow core PCF infrastructure may be-
come the natural backbone for the relativistic QKD network,
since the difference between the propagation speed and c is
minimal in such fibers.
Yet another practical possibility is to use the same phase-
encoding hardware either in conventional (when no reliable
information about distance is available) or relativistic mode.
This may be a good compromise for attaining the best possible
security scenario depending on the particular circumstances.
In conclusion, we report a relativistic QKD system, which,
unlike conventional protocols, offers inherent resistance
against USD based attacks under arbitrary large channel loss
while using practical weak coherent pulses as information
carriers. Our experimental setup operates via a 180 m uni-
directional single-mode free-space quantum channel with the
active tracking system. Due to its simple structure and straight-
forward security foundations, this protocol may become the
first practical QKD protocol with as general a security proof
as for BB84. Its advantages are best attained in line-of-sight
metropolitan links up to several kilometers long between sta-
tionary objects or in the future low loss hollow core PCF
networks, where ultimate security needs meet the ease of
experimental realization.
Methods
Hardware implementation. The light source is a CW-
driven 90 mW 780 nm laser diode with an external cavity
based on a 1800/mm diffraction grating in Littrow configu-
ration. Phase modulators used are low frequency PM fiber
coupled lithium niobate modulators that have no internal elec-
trical waveguide and termination. Unlike traveling wave mod-
ulators, this type can be used for simultaneous interferometer
adjustment and high-speed phase modulation due to their tol-
erance to large DC offsets. The single photon detector is based
on a silicon Geiger mode avalanche photodiode package with
the internal thermoelectric cooler. Its quantum efficiency is
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35% and the dark count rate is around 700 Hz. The tracking
system uses PI S-330.80L piezo tip-tilt platforms with 2” mir-
rors. The main resonance frequency for this steering mirror
configuration is around 920 Hz. As a beacon light source
we use a 10 mW directly modulated 850 nm laser diode. Its
radiation is collimated using 0.5NA F = 8 mm aspheric lens.
Quadrant photodiodes have 3×3 mm2 active area and they
are placed in the focal plane of the F = 80 mm focusing lens.
To smooth the feedback response a 1500 grit ground glass
diffuser is placed a few mm before the photodiode. The AC
component of the detected signal is summed from all the
quadrants, is frequency corrected, amplified and converted
to a binary data stream — the classical communication chan-
nel. The DC component is amplified separately for all the
quadrants and then the vertical and horizontal error channels
are formed by pairwise subtraction of corresponding signals.
The error signals are scaled with respect to the total received
power and are input into the two PID control loops. Fine
synchronization between the stations is performed by the PLL
which locks to the received digital waveform of the classical
channel. The used Manchester encoding ensures that there is
enough zero crossings for the PLL to operate regardless of the
transmitted data.
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Supplementary materials
System operation and data flow patterns
Figure 7 shows the data flow chart within the system. Before
the protocol starts, Alice and Bob obtain random sequences
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from the laptops and store them in buffers PHM A, PHM B,
and SYNC B. When both stations are ready, Bob initiates
the transfer by sending a request code. Alice replies with an
acknowledgment to indicate that she is also ready to proceed
to QKD. After the acknowledgment is received, Bob begins
transmission of the synchronization sequence. For each bit
received Alice replies with a quantum state, modulated ac-
cording with the PHM A value. She also stores the received
synchronization bit into SYNC A. Bob uses PHM B data to
change the state of the receiving interferometer and stores
single-photon detector clicks into SPD B.
After the packet is transferred Alice copies SYNC A buffer
to her laptop, and Bob does the same with the SPD B buffer.
The rest is performed using the laptops with TCP/IP connec-
tion between them. First, Alice and Bob compare the contents
of their synchronization buffers: SYNC A and SYNC B. If
they differ, the packet is discarded and is not used as a raw
key. If they are the same, the key sifting is performed. Bob
tells Alice the positions in SPD B when his detector produced
clicks. Alice creates her raw key from her PHM A data at the
specified positions. Bob uses PHM B for the same purpose,
but inverts all the data. Ideally, Alice and Bob should arrive
to the same key. However, experimental imperfections and
dark detector counts lead to errors. For the purpose of current
publications the raw keys were directly compared to calculate
corresponding QBER and estimate the asymptotic secret key
rate.
Relativistic protocol and the presence of air in the
channel
An important question is whether the protocol remain secure
under the presence of air in the quantum channel. So far in
the model we assumed that all signals in the quantum channel
propagate with the (vacuum) speed of light, which is not the
case for terrestrial line-of-sight atmospheric links. The an-
swer directly depends on the channel length and the delay ∆T
between the two WCPs in the quantum channel. If ∆T cannot
be compensated during the round trip by the eavesdropper
substituting a vacuum channel instead of the atmospheric one,
the system remains perfectly secure, as all the assumptions
remain correct. Theoretically, increasing ∆T we can achieve
secure operation even in the case of an optical fiber based link.
However, this becomes largely impractical as the required de-
lay equals a significant fraction of the communication distance.
So the receiving delay interferometer needs to be almost as
large and lossy as the channel itself, which is undesirable. Go-
ing to the extreme, any channel type can be supported if one
can guarantee that the first WCP reaches Bob’s setup before
the second one leaves Alice’s. This situation has much in
common with14, where this sequential quantum transfer was
proposed for the first time, but with single photons.
For calculations we assume that the air refraction index is
1.0002804 that corresponds to the group velocity in dry air
at 15 °C, 101.325 kPa and with 450 ppm CO2 content at the
wavelength of 780 nm. The maximal channel length is given
by
Lmax =
1
2
c∆T
n−1 ,
which gives Lmax = 10.7 km at ∆T = 20 ns. Therefore, current
experimental realization is well within the maximum range
limited by the presence of air, so it is as secure as it would be
with the vacuum quantum channel.
Receiving side interferometer alignment
In order to operate properly, the receiving side delay inter-
ferometer must be aligned such that without any phase shifts
no light propagates into the single-photon detector (SPD). In
practice, the required phase shift is constantly changing due to
thermal variations of the optical path lengths and also due to
slow wavelength drifts. Typical time-scale of these variations
is in the order of a minute or even shorter.
To solve the problem we implemented a closed loop con-
trol that takes the error signal from the SPD measurements
and adjusts the bias voltage. The error signal is a normalized
difference between the number of detector counts when bi-
ased above and below the current estimate, see Fig. 8. The
smaller the number of counts the larger are the statistical fluc-
tuations of the error signal, so the obtained error signal is
scaled appropriately to ensure stable convergence to the best
estimate.
The system uses two 4 ms long time windows to calculate
detector counts when biased below and above the current
value. The rest of the 16 ms time frame is used for quantum
key distribution. Then all the steps are repeated again. The
effective feedback speed depends on the signal strength and
usually is at least several Hz, which is enough to track the
phase changes in real time.
The phase modulator can produce phase shifts of several
wavelengths, but nevertheless sometimes the bias voltage
needs to keep increasing even when it hits its allowed maxi-
mum value. In this case our digital feedback scheme makes a
step back by several full wavelengths, decreasing the required
voltage but keeping the same phase relations. The described
scheme proved to work well under broad range of conditions,
and can be easily relied upon in practice.
Single mode free-space channel and tracking sys-
tem
The single mode free-space channel itself is an advanced
piece of equipment. The presence of moving air in the chan-
nel makes the link to have dynamic behavior and, therefore,
requires an active tracking system.
The active tracking system corrects only for the most crit-
ical channel disturbance — deviation of the beam from a
straight line. Higher order perturbations, not accounted in
our approach, lead to beam profile distortion, which also con-
tributes to the coupling loss, but requires much more advanced
adaptive optics tools to correct. Previous reports20, 21 show
satisfactory behavior of similar tracking systems at operation
distances up to 1 km at telecommunication wavelengths. This
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gives us confidence that such systems can be extended to
even longer metropolitan scale free-space single mode links,
that makes our relativistic QKD approach viable and ready
to substitute some conventional fiber-based QKD methods.
Another experiment22 confirms that even a 150 km range is
feasible for a single mode free-space link. As the security
of the proposed QKD protocol is totally decoupled from the
channel loss, future development of low dark count nanowire
single photon detectors may overcome current system loss
limitation and make it suitable for 100 km range free-space
QKD.
Operation of our tracking system does not require any clas-
sical communication channel between the stations. Each sta-
tion performs the following task: it measures the direction
of the beacon light arrival and points the transmission beam
exactly at the same direction. Due to the link reciprocity, this
makes sure that the transmitted beam always reaches the des-
tination. In other words, each station has its own closed loop
control of the steering mirror, and this is enough for a stable
operation of the whole link.
Beacon light is slightly defocused such that it creates a half
meter diameter spot at the end of the channel. Initial setup
requires coarse pointing of the stations to each other, so each
of them could see the beacon light from the other. After this is
achieved, stations fall into the closed loop control mode and
the quantum link becomes ready for QKD. Importantly, after
link downing when something blocks the beams, it reliably
recovers by itself and does not need any operator intervention.
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